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3E1.1

Section

provides

a two-

or three-level

reduction to the defendant who "clearly demon
strates acceptance of responsibility forhis offense."
Despite several amendments to the guideline and its
the meaning

commentary,

of

"acceptance

of respon

sibility" remains vague. As a result, ? 3E1.1 has
become one of themost frequently litigated guide
lines, and the Judicial Conference of theUnited
States has called for a "fundamental reformation" of
the provision.1 Much of the confusion may stem
from a lack of clear purpose in the guideline.2 This
article identifies two distinct animating principles in
? 3E1.1?remorse

and

the

cooperation?discusses

manner inwhich courts have juggled these prin
ciples, and proposes a restructuring thatwould
refocus the guideline on just one of them. My
conclusion

raises

some

larger

questions

about

how

the guidelines handle post-offense conduct.
I.

Background
Section 3E1.1 grew out of theCommission's
dilemma in deciding how guilty pleas should be
treated under the guidelines. During the early
phases of developing the guidelines, theCommis
sion considered a proposal to provide a fixed,
automatic "discount" forguilty pleas.3 Such a
provision would have codified pre-guideline
practices. The Commission's data indicated that
defendants who pled guilty received, on average,
sentences between thirtyand fortypercent lower
than if theyhad gone to trial.4Many viewed this
as a
to encourage
discount
incentive
necessary
as a necessary
and guilty pleas
lubri
guilty pleas,
cant for an overburdened
criminal
justice
system.5
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offense conduct, itwas thought that the proposal
might result in "unjustified windfalls" to some
defendants, and "would not be in keeping with the
public's perception of justice."8
The Commission thus faced a conundrum: how
could an encouragement forguilty pleas be built into
the guidelines without incurring the disadvan
tages?and

form

than during

the pre-guideline

era.

Nonetheless, the original Commission rejected
the automatic discount, fearing that itmight be
construed as a penalty fordefendants who exercised
their constitutional right to a jury trial.7Moreover,
because it awarded a benefit forpleading guilty,
regardless of the nature of the offense or other post
*
Law Clerk toJudgeJanetBond Arterton (D. Conn.). The
views of theauthordo not necessarily reflectthoseofJudge
Arter ton.A longerversion of thisarticlewill appear in the
Northwestern Law Review in thesummerof1997.

constitutional

perhaps

an

infirmities?of

automatic sentence discount? The Commission
settled on theunique solution of ? 3E 1.1: rather than
rewarding guilty pleas per se, it invited judges to
a benefit for "acceptance of
responsibility"
I provide
("a/r"). The oddity of this provision is revealed by
its absence in state guideline systems.9 The Commis
sion apparently felt that ? 3E1.1 could advance the
same

purposes

of an automatic

plea

discount

without the unseemly results. What precisely were
the advantages of the plea discount?
A. The Cooperation Paradigm
First, a guilty plea provided immediate, concrete
benefits to society at large: "such pleas conserve the
resources

of the criminal

justice

system,

and

...

witnesses (particularly victims) are spared the stress
of a trial."10 The "acceptance of responsibility"
provision was designed to advance these interestsby
encouraging guilty pleas, but could also encourage
other "socially desirable actions," such as "tak[ing]
affirmative steps towards disassociation frompast
criminal conduct, and . . . rectify[ing] the harm done
to others."11 The intentof thisprong of a/r is to
provide incentives fora defendant to engage in
certain

socially-desirable

conduct?meaning

prima

rily, though not exclusively, pleading guilty?
between the time of his offense and the time of
sentencing. This is an expression ofwhat I term the
"cooperation paradigm" of ? 3E1.1.
B. The Remorse Paradigm

plea

Indeed, Commission research suggested that eighty
fivepercent of federal criminal sentences involved
some formof plea bargaining.6 The automatic plea
discount proposal would have retained an incentive
for such plea bargaining, but in a more predictable

101

In the Commission's

view,

however,

rewarding

guilty pleas (and a/r) also had another purpose, less
oriented to gaining immediate benefits for society,
and more oriented towards giving a break to

defendants

with

certain

personal

characteristics.

The

Commission observed that "the guilty plea 'is the
first step toward
rehabilitation,'"12
conduct
a/r (such
demonstrating

and

that other

as disassociation

from criminal conduct and rectificationof past
harms) "is a sound indicator of rehabilitative
potential."13 This hypothesis is associated with the
second major animating principle of ? 3E1.1, which I
term the "remorse paradigm." Under thisparadigm,
? 3E1.1 is less concerned with the objective post
offense conduct of a defendant, and more concerned
with the defendant's subjective state ofmind
towards his offense. Although conduct is a relevant
indicator in this inquiry, conduct alone, no matter
how

cooperative,

is not

dispositive.
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to balance

attempts

remorse

and

For

paradigms.

the cooperation
are
judges

instance,

strongly discouraged from awarding the ? 3E1.1
discount to defendants who go to trial or who
an enhancement

receive

? 3C1.1

under

for obstruc

tion of justice.14 This seems much in the spirit of the
cooperation paradigm: obstructing justice and
putting the government to itsburden of proof at trial
a waste

cause

may

of public

resources

and

thwart

other law enforcement agencies and such behavior is
clearly to be discouraged. Yet, neither action
a lack of remorse

indicates

necessarily

or

precludes

the possibility of rehabilitation prior to sentencing.
However, the defendant who goes to trial or ob
structs justice is generally excluded from the ? 3E1.1
benefit, even ifhe subsequently "admits guilt and
remorse."15

expresses

Although the guideline's treatment of defen
dants who go to trial or obstruct justice clearly
emphasizes the cooperation paradigm, ? 3E1.1 seems

more

oriented

on

its face

remorse

towards

with

respect to other defendants. In these cases, the a/r
inquiry is intended to be open-minded and discre
tionary. Application note one to ? 3E1.1 lists several

considerations

that are

to consider

"appropriate"

in

this inquiry, but insists that this list is not meant to

be

exhaustive.

Application

note

five states,

"The

sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a
defendant's acceptance of responsibility. For this
reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is
entitled to great deference on review." Why is the
sentencing judge in such a "unique position"? The
most obvious explanation lies in the sentencing
judge's ability to determine whether the defendant
has a remorseful demeanor. As an earlier draft of
the application note expanded on this point: "The
sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate
whether the offender's post-offense conduct is
sincere

or

merely

self-serving."16

From

this commen

tary, it is clear that the aspects of the application
notes emphasizing the discretionary nature of the ?
3E1.1 inquiry are associated with the remorse
paradigm.

/October

2, September
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C. Balancing the Paradigms
The Commission thus posited two purposes for
rewarding a/r: (1) encouraging desirable post
offense conduct, and (2) recognizing rehabilitative
potential. The Commission did not clearly indicate
how judges were toweigh these purposes against
one another. For instance,what of the defendant
whose post-offense conduct provided substantial
social benefits, but whose words and demeanor
suggested littlehope for rehabilitation? What of the
defendant who went to trial and otherwise signifi
cantly taxed the criminal justice system, but who
appeared genuinely to have turned over a new leaf
in his life?
The application notes to ? 3E1.1 reflect the
Commission's

9, No.

Vol.

Reporter:
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II.

Judicial Application of Acceptance of
Responsibility
Appellate courts generally take application note
five's requirement of deference quite seriously, and
tend

to focus

concurrently

on

the remorse

para

digm.17 Denials of the a/r adjustment are usually
upheld when the sentencing court has made any
sort of express finding that the offender lacks
contrition, even where the finding iswholly
conclusory.18 Thus, appellate courts have provided
littlemore guidance than has theCommission in
how to implement the competing principles of ?
3E1.1.19

Despite (or perhaps due to) the lack of guidance
from theCommission and the appellate courts, trial
courts seem to have largely treated ? 3E1.1 as the
automatic plea discount that theCommission
originally considered and rejected. Overall, 84
percent of defendants receive the adjustment;20 data
compiled by theCommission suggests that 88
percent of thosewho plead guilty receive a reduc
tion, in comparison to only 20 percent of thosewho
go to trial.21As an Eighth Circuit panel remarked
upon such data, "Itmay be that in each case addi
tional factors [beyond the guilty plea] led the court
to grant the reduction, but that seems unlikely."22
Furthermore, because of the lack of guidance
from theCommission and the appellate courts, there
is very little constraint on individual judges who
implement a differing view of ? 3E1.1. And, indeed,
there is some evidence of disparity. A 1989 analysis
of four districts in the Eighth Circuit indicated that
the percentage of defendants pleading guilty who
receive the ? 3E1.1 adjustment varied from fifty-four
percent to eighty-six percent.23 A 1992 analysis of
plea

in three

practices

bargaining

cities

also

pre

sented evidence of disparity.24 In one district, judges
awarded the reduction in over ninety percent of
guilty-plea cases and an astonishing fortypercent of
cases

to trial?twice

going

the national

average.25

In

another district, judges were similarly generous
with guilty-plea cases, but awarded the discount to
only twenty-five to thirtypercent of defendants
to trial.26

going
case

One may also observe disparity in the published
law.

For

instance,

in United

States

v. Harris/7

a

robbery defendant who pled guilty was denied an
a/r adjustment for engaging in three types of
noncooperative behavior: changing address without
notifying the court, failing a drug test, and failing
"to take advantage of opportunities fordrug
rehabilitation and counseling."28 In United States v.
Schultz,29by contrast, the defendant, who pled guilty
to a money

notwithstanding

a reduction
received
offense,
laundering
an extensive
list of similar behav

iors: failure to complete a prescribed treatment

program

for alcohol

abuse,

refusal

to provide

urine

samples, missed appointments with his probation
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officer,and an arrest fordrunk driving, afterwhich
the defendant's

pretrial

release

was

revoked.30

It

seems clear that the Schultz court employed a
different standard for? 3E1.1 than that applied in

Harris.

III. Unresolved Problems with ? 3E1.1
The present state of ? 3E 1.1 raises numerous
concerns. The ambiguity of the guideline produces
an unnecessary quantity of appellate litigation and
unwarranted sentencing disparity. Ambiguity also
serves to undermine the underlying policy goals of
the provision as stated by theCommission, i.e.,
recognizing rehabilitative potential and encouraging
desired post-offense conduct. If judges focus
primarily on rewarding desired conduct, then ? 3E1.1
may not effectively serve to distinguish defendants
who "enter the correctional system in a frame of
mind that affords hope for success in rehabilita
tion"31from thosewho do not. If judges focus
primarily on state ofmind, then the ability of ? 3E 1.1
to encourage desired behavior will be diminished.32
To the extent that ? 3E1.1 actually functions as a
plea discount, which seems to be the case inmost
districts, the guideline may also be criticized for a
certain dishonesty. There is a disjunction between
the rhetoric of theCommission and the appellate
courts,which emphasizes remorse, and the reality of
day-to-day implementation of the guideline. This
disjunction is troubling in light of the supposed
"truth in sentencing" goal of the guidelines. The
need foropenness in the context of ? 3E 1.1may be
particularly acute, for the provision trenches on the
rights of defendants to trialby jury.When a
reduction that is routinely granted to over eighty
percent of defendants is generally denied to defen
dants who go to trial,one may easily recon
ceptualize the "reduction" provision as a penalty
imposed for exercising a constitutional right. Such a
penalty may ormay not be good public policy, and it
may ormay not be permitted by theConstitution,
but the precise contours of the penalty should be
fullyopen to judicial review and public debate.
Finally, the remorse element of ? 3E1.1, while
more prevalent in appellate case law than in the
practices of district courts, raises a variety of
concerns in and of itself. Plainly, the remorse
inquirywill be affected by an offender's perfor
mance in the court and during meetings with
probation officers. Yet, quality of performance?
words

of contrition,

humble

demeanor,

etc.?may

be

less a function of "rehabilitative potential" than of
coaching by a good lawyer, intelligence,mental
health, and experience in interactingwith people
who belong to the racial and socioeconomic classes
fromwhich most judges and probation officers
come.33 A remorse adjustment risks bias against
certain groups, and may largely reward those
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capable ofmanipulating the expectations of judges
and probation officers. As theNinth Circuit recently
noted, in a rare appellate decision that explores the
purposes of ? 3E 1.1 at some length, "There is no
particular purpose to be served by lenience towards
thosewho crymore easily, or have sufficient
criminal experience to display sentiment at sentenc
ing instead of restraining their emotions in public."34
As Judge Frankel has written, "The effort to appraise
'character'

is, to be

sure,

a

parlous

one,

and

not

necessarily an enterprise forwhich judges are
notably equipped by prior training."35
In lightof such concerns, ? 3E1.1 is clearly in
need of reform. Indeed, theCommission itselfhas
not been insensitive to the problems surrounding the
guideline. In 1991, a working group prepared a
lengthy report on acceptance of responsibility.36
Unfortunately, although theworking group raised
important questions concerning ambiguity, dispar
ity,and appropriate distinctions between different
types of post-offense conduct, the group's report
focused on relatively narrow proposals to add an
extra level of discount to ? 3E 1.1 and to address self
incrimination concerns thathad produced a circuit
split. The working group's discussion of these
matters was thoughtful and surely contributed to
subsequent amendments of the guideline, but the
bigger questions received short shrift.37
IV. Proposals forReform
As the Judicial Conference has suggested, the
time is ripe formore substantial reformof ? 3E 1.1. In
particular, I propose that the provision be clearly
focused on one purpose, specifically, encouraging
desired post-offense conduct. Section 3E1.1 might be
restructured along the following lines:
? 3E1.1 Adjustment for Cooperative Behavior
(a)

The sentencing judge may reduce the offense
level by 0 to 3 levels based on the degree to

which

the defendant's

post-offense

conduct

facilitates the efficientand fair administration
of the criminal justice system and the
recovery

(b)

cooperative

(c)

restoration

and

of victims.

For defendants who plead guilty and do not
otherwise engage in any significantly
or

uncooperative

conduct,

the

uncooperative

conduct,

the

presumptive reduction shall be 2 levels.
For defendants who go to trial and do not
otherwise engage in any significantly
cooperative

or

presumptive reduction shall be 0 levels.
This proposal is consistent with the spirit of the
recent Judicial Conference proposal, which seeks to
reform ? 3E1.1 such that the guideline will no longer
"tr[y] to do toomuch with one adjustment."38

Federal
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conduct.

Judges

would

have

greater

flexibility in awarding ? 3E1.1 benefits: rather than
an all-or-nothing two-point reduction with a
potential third-point available to a small class of
defendants, judges would be permitted to reduce
any

sentence

by one,

two, or three points.40

On

the

other hand, judges would be precluded from
denying thebenefit based on unremorseful de
or on

meanor

statements

by

the defendant

not

rising

to the level of obstruction of justice. In short, the
remorse paradigm would be stripped out of ? 3E1.1.41
Alternatively, theCommission might consider
either returning to the notion of a fixed, automatic
plea discount, or eliminating ? 3E1.1 altogether.
Both solutions would address the current ambiguity
of the guideline, as well as the problematic role of
remorse in the current system, but both of these
solutions present difficulties of their own. A plea
discount offers less flexibility than a cooperation
discount, leaving much cooperative behavior
unrewarded, and possibly producing the sorts of
unseemly

results

Commission.
likewise

reduce

that originally

concerned

the

Eliminating ? 3E1.1 altogether would
incentives

for cooperative

post

offense conduct. Indeed, removing ? 3E1.1 would
take away the one explicit plea inducement provi
sion in the guidelines. Much research suggests that
plea bargaining would still continue without such a
provision,42 but elimination of ? 3E 1.1might "drive
plea inducements furtherunderground, with the
result

V.

of even more

arbitrariness

and

Vol.

Reporter:

9, No.

/October

2, September
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However, the reconceptualization of ? 3E1.1 pro
posed here as a cooperation adjustment may lend
even greater clarity and coherence to the guideline
than the Judicial Conference's proposal.39
The cooperation adjustment is generally
consistent with existing practices. Those who plead
guilty will routinely receive a benefit and thosewho
go to trialwill not. But, also as in the present
system, these adjustments would not be automatic:
defendants who plead guiltymay still lose their
benefit forviolating the terms of pretrial release,
obstructing justice, or engaging in comparably poor
behavior. Defendants who go to trialmay still
qualify for a reduction based on other aspects of
post-offense

Sentencing

disparity."43

The Broader Issues
The problems of acceptance and plea induce
ment point to larger dilemmas of guideline sentenc
ing, particularly the proper treatment of post-offense
conduct. Such conduct is presently handled in a
fragmentaryway, touched on by such disparate
provisions as ? 3E1.1, ? 5K1.1 (departure for substan
tial assistance to authorities), ? 3C1.1 (obstructing or
impeding the administration of justice), ? 3C1.2
(reckless endangerment during flight),and ? 1B1.3
(relevant conduct). A reformof ? 3E1.1, such as I
have proposed, thatplaces the guideline more clearly

among this body of provisions invites reconsidera
tion of how these provisions relate to one another
and fit into the guideline scheme as a whole.
The linkages between ? 5K1.1 and ? 3E1.1,
particularly when the latter is conceptualized as a
cooperation adjustment, are especially noteworthy.

The

substantial

assistance

a rather

seems

provision

anomalous guideline at present: defendants who

in the
assistance
"substantial"
provide
investigation
or
and who
receive
of
another
person,
prosecution
motion
for departure
from the government,
may

a

benefit from a potentially limitless downward
departure?they may be sentenced anywhere below
the suggested guideline range. But defendants who,
tryas theymight, do not succeed in providing the
simply
rightkind or degree of assistance?maybe
because

they

are

small-time

criminals

are not

who

capable of aiding the prosecution of others?or who
cannot obtain favorable treatment from a fickle
prosecutor, are not provided any express benefit
under the guidelines.44 Yet, a defendant may
provide meaningful assistance to the government that
does not rise to the level of substantial, as, for
instance, by pleading guilty.
My proposal would render ? 5K1.1 less anoma
lous by clearly providing incentives for intermediate

assistance.

reform would

such

Yet,

also

underscore

other problematic aspects of ? 5K1.1. Why, for
instance, should the ? 5K1.1 benefit only be available
a

upon

prosecutor's

motion,

while

rests on a

?3E1.1

judge's discretion? Why should ? 5K1.1 entirely
"drop the floor" frombeneath a defendant, while
? 3E1.1 provides a benefit subject to clear limitations?
Perhaps the two provisions should be combined, or at
least

so as

restructured,
fashion.

to function

in a more

comple

mentary

The chapter 3C guidelines, which provide
for obstruction

enhancements

of justice

and

reckless

endangerment during flight,might also be better
integratedwith a reformed ? 3E1.1. Both obstruc
tion and

priate

reckless

considerations

seem
endangerment
in a cooperation

quite

appro
In

inquiry.

the interests of simplicity and clarity, the 3C
guidelines might thus be eliminated altogether.45
Merger of 3C and 3E would also diminish the
current problem thatdefendants who plead guilty
are subject tomuch greater penalties forobstruction
than defendants who go to trial. The defendant who
pleads will normally receive a two or three level
reduction, but if such a defendant obstructs justice,
he will receive the two-level ? 3C1.1 enhancement
and also lose his ? 3E1.1 benefit. Merger would
permit similar acts of obstruction to be treated
similarly, regardless ofmode of conviction.
Enlarging the scope of a reformed ? 3E1.1 and
merging the provision with other guidelines might
thus enhance their integrity.However, larger
questions

remain:

How

should

non-offense

conduct

Federal
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be weighed in the context of a sentencing scheme
designed to "avoid unwarranted sentencing dispari
ties among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar conduct?"46 How
can the principle of proportionality in sentencing be
reconciled with the purely utilitarian imperatives
that lie behind something like a cooperation adjust
ment? How can themagnitude of adjustments for
post-offense conduct be appropriately scaled, such
that the number of levels added or subtracted bears
some rational relationship to the implicit ranking of
social harms set forth inChapter Two?
VI. Conclusion
However it addresses such questions, the
Commission would do well to bear inmind one of
themost salient lessons of the ? 3E1.1 experience:
The institutional pressures and constraints facing
district courts, as well as the individual perspectives
of sentencing judges, impose significant limitations
on top-down sentencing reforms. Although the
Commission expressly disavowed an automatic plea
benefit, ? 3E1.1 has generally become just that.
Indeed, ?3E1.1 is not the only example of this
phenomenon; other observers have noted the
pressures formasked avoidance of the guidelines.47
Thus, it is far from clear thatunwarranted disparity
is any less frequentnow than in the pre-guideline
era.48 Guided

in

discretion

sentencing

remains

a

compelling vision; however, guidance will not
succeed unless sentencing actors are willing and able
to be guided. Guidance must be clear, principled,
and ultimately founded on the accumulated wisdom

of the nation's

courts.

sentencing
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on the
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A PROPOSED AMENDMENT
TO ? 3E1.1
(ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY)
Fundamental

reformation

of the acceptance

of

responsibility guideline, ? 3E1.1, is needed, primarily
because the various factorswhich comprise the
current

The Abolition

who

(1992).

(citing survey

In a letterdatedDecember 5,1995, Judge
Maryanne
Trump Barry,Chairwoman of theCommitteeon Criminal
Law of theJudicialConferenceof theUnited States,wrote a
lettertoJudgeRichard Conaboy, Chairman of theUnited
States SentencingCommission, urging that theCommis
sion consider twoamendments to thesentencingguidelines,
notwithstandingtheCommission's initiationofa broader
program to reviewand assess theguidelines. One of these
"specificand narrowlyfocused amendments" concerned
revisionof? 3E1.1. Following are therelevantportions of
theJudicialConference's submission toJudgeConaboy.
I.

Implementing Commission-Based
Sentencing
The Lessons of theFirst Ten Years inMinnesota,
2
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 279, 316-17; Robert A. Weninger,
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L.J. 1681, 1726-27
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appellate
scrutiny than the current a/r determinations.
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? 3553.
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from the
may be similarly differentiated

conduct
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to

"acceptance"

adjustment

interact with

each

other not only to generate needless litigation,but to
deny theutility of a separate, independent incentive
solely for the entry of a plea. As a consequence, either
the other factors interferewith the court's ability to
reward a plea, or, if the reduction is rewarded fora
plea, the other factors are lost. The court is unable to
distinguish between a begrudging, reluctant timely
plea (forwhich the full threepoints must be
awarded), and a timely "plea plus" where the
defendant pleads as well as shows genuine remorse,
demonstrates assistance to authorities, has undergone
post-offense rehabilitative efforts,and/or some of the
other factorswhich the guideline attempts to reward.
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A.

Interfering Factors: Need for Separate
Plea Incentive
The case law indicates continued confusion with
theway the acceptance of responsibility guideline has
come tobe interpreted. Astonishingly, the acceptance
guideline accounts for the thirdhighest number of
appeals.1 This confusion is generated by the interac
tion and definition of thenumerous factors listed in
the current acceptance guideline, all ofwhich
the vague

Com

of "acceptance."2

concept

mission data shows thatnearly a thirdof the appeals
in FY 1994 involving this guideline were based on
and

"application

definition

issues."3

Factors such as how much the defendant has to
"admit" (or not "falsely deny"), the timeliness of the
plea, the extent of thedefendant's remorse, or the
extent

of the
government's

account

"preparation,"

for

much of the litigation and confusion surrounding this
guideline, because the determination of the entire
guideline can turnon these issues. Worse, they cloud
and

the court's

complicate

efforts,

and

need,

to

reward the entry of a plea in order to conserve judicial
and other resources. The current guideline tries todo
toomuch with one adjustment (the separate adjust
ment has not been effective,as discussed below), and
consequently itdoes not serve any of itsnumerous
goals

well.

Any plea incentive is inextricably intertwined
with issues of attitude, other conduct, the
government's preparation, etc.which either get lost in
the overwhelming thrust to reward a plea, orworse,
prevent theplea incentive fromworking. How does a
court reward the entry of a plea where the defendant
has done something (perhaps submitted a bad urine
sample) which arguably prevents the allowance of the
first 2-level

reward

There
adjustment?
for the many
non-plea

is no way
incentives

a

to
provide
listed in

? 3E1.1 if the court rewards the entry of theplea; the

other

or vice

incentives
versa.

either

over-come

In a case where

the plea
incentive,
the defendant
agrees

to

simply enter a timelyplea, and if the court rewards
the plea, itmust do so with the full threepoints (as
discussed below), with no adjustment leftto act as an
incentive for the other commendable conduct which
the guideline attempts to encourage.
The Commission has always stopped short of
allowing an adjustment solely for the entry of a plea.
The plea incentive ismerely one ofmany incentives.
"Plea"

ment

is not

part

even mentioned

of the guideline.

in the 2-level

However,
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adjust
the Commis

sion has moved in the direction of directly rewarding
a plea. A 1990 amendment sought to clarify that the
adjustment is generally not available to a defendant
at trial, express
to its
the government
puts
proof
a 1992
on conviction.4
remorse
In addition,
only
ing
to commentary
moved
from guideline
amendment

who

the statement that the court could consider imposing
the reduction without regard towhether the convic
tionwas based on a plea or a trial,and itadded the

third level adjustment, one basis forwhich is the
entry of an early plea.5
B. Constitutionality of Separate Plea Incentive
The Commission need not be reluctant to
provide a direct incentive fora plea, because it is clear
from

long-standing

Court

Supreme

law,

as well

as a

comprehensive reading of appellate cases on the
currentguideline, that a plea reward would be
upheld as constitutional and justifiedby thebenefit
which a plea brings the system. The rationale would
no doubt be the same as thatused by the Supreme
Court inupholding plea bargaining, a procedure
which offers a discounted sentence fora plea in order
toprovide thebenefit of theplea to the system.
While theSupreme Court has not ruled on the
constitutionality of the current acceptance of respon
sibilityguideline,6 ithas established a solid body of
case law upholding plea bargaining practices or
statuteswhich result in lower sentences for thosewho
plead than for thosewho go to trial. In Corbitt v.New
Jersey,439 US. 212, 99 S. Ct. 492 (1978), a New Jersey
statutewas challenged thatmandated a lifesentence
fora defendant convicted by a jury of firstdegree
murder, but allowed thepossibility of a lesser
sentence if thedefendant entered a plea. The
Supreme Court held that statesmay encourage guilty
pleas by reducing the sentences imposed after a plea.
The court stated that "not every burden on the
exercise of a constitutional right and not every
pressure

or

encouragement

to waive

such

a

right

is

invalid." Id. at 2187 Similarly, in Bordenkircherv.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1978), the
Court upheld the government's right towithhold
leniency fora homicide defendant who went to trial,
and held that the key to the constitutionality of plea
bargaining iswhether the defendant has the freedom
to choose

between

sentence

options.

In these cases the court relied on itsown
previous

cases

sustaining

plea

bargaining,

a

practice

which inherently rewards pleas and "penalizes"
those who

go

to trial.

For

example,

in U.S.

v.

Brady,

397 U.S. 742, 752, 90 S. Ct. 1463,1471 (1970), the
Court held that thepreservation of prosecutorial and
judicial resources justifies a sentencing scheme that
favors guilty pleas and justifiesplea bargaining.
These same rationales would apply to a sentence
reduction for the entry of a plea in the guideline
context.8

C The All or Nothing, "Tello" Problem
An extra, thirdpoint adjustment for an early
plea or cooperation was added in 1992.9While the
goal might have been to provide more flexibility in
rewarding particularly early pleas, the result in
practice has been to require all three levels for any
plea which is conceivably "timely." Its potential
usefulness was limited by the fact that the defendant
must have qualified for the 2-level provision before
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he or she can be considered for the extra, third level
adjustment.

The courts have reinforced this tie, as demon
strated by U.S. v. Tello, 9 F.3d 1119 (5thCir. 1993),
where the court held thatonce a court awards the 2
level adjustment fora "timely" plea, the court has no
discretion but to award the thirdpoint, as well. In
that case thedefendant gave false information to the
probation officerabout his criminal history and
caused additional investigation tobe conducted. The
court

sentencing

the sentence

increased

for obstruc

tion,but, in spite of the guidelines' admonition to the
court

the sentencing

contrary,10

also

the defen

gave

dant the 2-level acceptance reduction because he
entered a "timely" plea, but withheld the third level
reduction because of the obstruction. The Fifth
Circuit held that the court had no discretion to
withhold the extra level if it imposed the 2-levels on
thebasis of a timelyplea. The court said that the
obstruction

once

"evaporated"

the court

awarded

the

2-points, and then all thatmattered was whether the
criteriaof the extra point reduction applied.11 There
fore, the courtmust award 3 levels, ifany at all, fora
timelyplea, with no ability to adjust the total reduc
tion forany of the other factors involved.
Nor could the court have done the reverse: deny
the 2-level adjustment because of the obstruction (or
some

other

non-plea

reason),

but

impose

the one

level adjustment to attempt to reward the timelyplea.
This was, in fact,what the sentencing court tried to
do inU.S. v. Solis, 39 F.3d 568 (5thCir. 1994). There it
did not award the 2-levels in ? 3El.l(a) for several
reasons,mostly unrelated to timeliness of theplea,
but then imposed the 1-level for the timelyplea. The
sentence

was

reversed

on

appeal.

the

However,

appellate court noted the irony that the one point
provision (whichmentions a plea) cannot be imposed
if the 2-point provision (which does not mention a
plea)

even for some
is denied,
cases
These
illustrate not

reason.
non-plea
the
only
problem

with

the extra point adjustment, but also theneed fora
separate

plea

incentive,

in order

to avoid

confusion

and interferencebetween the reward fora plea and
the reward (orwithholding of the reward) for the
other incentives provided in the guideline.
D.

Conclusion

The current guideline has generated confusion
and litigation. More importantly, itdoes not allow
the court to distinguish between a defendant who
merely pleads guilty and one who also does some of
the thingsdescribed inApplication Note 1. Admit
tedly a court could decide thatmerely pleading guilty
is not enough tobe "acceptance of responsibility."
However, all courts are confrontedwith the inescap
able fact that,with the increasing federalization of
crime, our criminal justice system could not function
without a large number of guilty pleas, even if the
defendant iswilling to do littlemore than enter the

1996
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plea. Our proposal recognizes that reality,but allows
an additional decrease for thedefendant who does
more. Options 2 and 3would make a clear distinction
between a guilty plea and a "timely" guilty plea. We
would also support a possible 4-level discount in
larger cases, as inOption 3, if the Sentencing Commis
sion determines this tobe acceptable.
Application Note 1would remain substantially as
it is, as a listingof criteria applicable to the determina
tion of the "acceptance of responsibility" provision in
our proposals. We suggest that a factorbe added to
that listing:whether the defendant cooperated with
theprobation officer inproviding information
necessary for thepreparation of thepresentence
report. The remainder of the commentarywould be
streamlined

one

to a bare minimum.

E. Proposed Guidelines: ? 3E1.1
The Committee asks that theCommission adopt

of the following

amendments,

as a

replacement

for the current acceptance of responsibility guideline:
? 3E1.1 Acceptance of Responsibility
Option 1:
(a) Decrease the offense level by up to 3 levels
according to the following, independently deter
mined,

factors:

(1) If the defendant timely enters a plea of
guilty, therebypermitting the government to avoid
preparing for trial and permitting the court to allocate
its resources efficiently,decrease the offense level by 2
levels; and
(2) If the defendant otherwise clearly demon
strates acceptance of responsibility for the offense,
decrease the offense level by 1 level.
(b) Notwithstanding the above, if the
defendant's offense level determined prior to the
operation of this guideline is below 16, decrease the
offense level by no more than 2 levels for this
guideline.

Option 2:
(a) Decrease the offense level by up to 3 levels
according to the following, independently deter
mined,

factors:

(1) If the defendant enters a plea of guilty,
decrease the offense level by 1 level;
(2) If theplea of guilty is timely entered, thereby
permitting the government to avoid preparing for
trial and permitting the court to allocate its resources
efficiently,decrease the offense level by 1 level; and
(3) If the defendant otherwise clearly demon
strates acceptance of responsibility for the offense,
decrease the offense level by 1 level.
(b) Notwithstanding the above, if the
defendant's offense level determined prior to the
operation of this guideline is below 16,decrease the
offense level by no more than 2 levels for this guide
line.
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factors:

(1) If the defendant enters a plea of guilty,
decrease the offense level by 2 levels;
(2) If the plea of guilty is timely entered, thereby
permitting the government to avoid preparing for
trial and permitting the court to allocate its resources
efficiently,decrease the offense level by 1 level; and
(3) If the defendant otherwise clearly demon
strates acceptance of responsibility for the offense,
decrease the offense level by 1 level.
(b) Notwithstanding the above, if the
defendant's offense level determined prior to the
operation of this guideline is below 16, decrease the
offense level by no more than 2 levels for this guide
line.
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